Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General)*, the potential application of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in the health context, and the role for the courts in determining the boundaries of the Canadian Medicare system have expanded significantly. As Donna Greschner points out in chapter 2, the *Charter* has been invoked to challenge both the underlying principles of Medicare and the type of services that are publicly funded. In the following paper I will discuss a recent case that challenges not government limits on public funding but rather the fundamental concept of one-tier Medicare: the case of *Chauli v. Quebec*, now before the Supreme Court of Canada. The appellants in the *Chauli* case are not arguing for higher levels of Medicare spending or for funding for particular services. Instead they allege that legislative limits on the provision of private health and hospital insurance coupled with a lack of timely access to provincially funded health care services in Quebec, violate their rights under section 7 of the *Charter*. In her decision, upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal, Quebec Superior Court Justice Ginette Piché found that section 7 of the *Charter* guarantees the right to health care, but statutory restrictions on private health insurance accord with the 'principles of fundamental justice.'

Recent health care system reviews have underscored the importance that Canadians attach to Medicare as a defining social program and as a symbol of Canadian values. In the Final Report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Commissioner Roy Romanow observed that 'Canadians consider equal and timely access to medically necessary services on the basis of need as a right of citizenship, not as a privilege of status or wealth.' Notwithstanding increasing pressures
placed upon it, Canadians have remained constant in their view that equality of access to health care must be preserved as a core and defining feature of the publicly funded Medicare system: “The Canadian approach to the provision of health care services continues to receive strong and passionate support. The public does not want to see any significant changes which would alter the fundamental principles of our health care system. They have an abiding sense of the values of fairness and equality and do not want to see a health care system in which the rich are treated differently from the poor.”

At the same time, Canadians are increasingly concerned about problems within the publicly funded system, especially lengthening waiting times for some acute care services. These concerns have, in turn, resulted in heightened attention, including from government-appointed review bodies such as the Clair and Mazankowski commissions, to proposals for greater privatization of health care funding and services as a means of increasing individual patient choice and of relieving pressure on the public system.

Against this backdrop, I will consider the potential implications of section 7 of the Charter for current debates over health care funding and reform, including the potential role of the Courts in determining what services are covered by Medicare. To that end, I will first examine the facts and lower-court rulings in the Chaoulli case, as a concrete illustration of the application of section 7 in the health care context. I will go on to assess the broader social implications of a section 7-based review of the health care system and conclude by considering the choices facing the Supreme Court of Canada in Chaoulli.

The Facts and Evidence in Chaoulli

At issue in Chaoulli is the constitutional validity of section 15 of Quebec’s Health Insurance Act and section 11 of the province’s Hospital Insurance Act. These provisions, the equivalent to which exist in most other provinces, prohibit private insurance contracts for publicly insured health and hospital services and, thus, effectively ensure a publicly funded single-payer system in Canada. In the context of resource constraints and delays within the public system, the appellants in Chaoulli claim that, by making delivery of private care uneconomical and thereby effectively depriving them of access to it, these legislative provisions violate their right to health under section 7 of the Charter.

In her judgment at trial, Justice Piché began by describing the ob-
stacles that the appellants themselves faced in attempting to obtain, or to provide, health care services in Quebec. Mr Gregory Zéliotis, who was sixty-seven years old at the time of trial and suffering from various health problems, complained of having to wait from June 1994 until May 1995 for a left hip replacement and from February until September 1997 for a right hip replacement. Dr Jacques Chaoulli, who completed his medical training in France prior to immigrating to Quebec in the late 1970s, reported several unsuccessful attempts to obtain government approval and funding for a twenty-four-hour ambulance service, a twenty-four-hour physician house-call service, and a private not-for-profit hospital.

After outlining the appellants’ interactions with the publicly funded system, Justice Piché reviewed the expert evidence adduced by the appellants in support of their claim, including evidence from a number of medical specialists in the fields of orthopaedic surgery, ophthalmology, oncology, and cardiology. These experts pointed to lengthy waiting lists; shortage of operating room time; shortage of nursing staff; shortage of, and outdated, equipment; erratic decision-making; ‘politicking’; and lack of planning within the publicly funded system. The appellants also called Barry Stein, a Montreal lawyer who, faced with treatment delays in Quebec, successfully challenged the provincial health insurance plan’s refusal to reimburse him for the costs of obtaining cancer care in New York State. Based on this evidence, Justice Piché agreed with the appellants’ claim that waiting lists were too long. In her view ‘même si ce n’est pas toujours une question de vie ou de mort, tous les citoyens ont droit à recevoir les soins dont ils ont besoin, et ce, dans les meilleurs délais.’

Justice Piché went on to consider the evidence put forward by the federal and Quebec governments in response to the appellants’ claim. Yale School of Management Professor Ted Marmor, whom Justice Piché quoted at length, identified a number of recurring concerns in the expert evidence called by the federal government and the province. Marmor argued that allowing the development of a parallel private health insurance system in Quebec and Canada generally would have a number of negative consequences. In particular, Marmor argued that introducing private insurance funding would lead to decreased public support for Medicare and, in particular, to a loss of support from more affluent and thus politically influential groups most likely to exit the system. As Marmor put it, ‘it is axiomatic that those who exit a public system no longer have a strong stake in its effective operation. This, in turn, can and frequently does lead to an erosion of public support.’
Marmor also cited unfair subsidies to the private system and private providers resulting from past and future public investment in hospitals, capital improvements, and research; diversion of financial and human resources away from, and lengthening of waiting lists in, the public system; increased government administrative costs required to regulate the private health insurance market; advantaging of those able to afford and to secure private coverage; and increased overall health spending with no clear improvement in health outcomes.\textsuperscript{25} As Marmor concluded, ‘the grounds used to bolster arguments for parallel insurance are uniformly weak empirically.’\textsuperscript{26}

Other experts called by the respondent governments pointed to the efficiency of the Canadian health insurance system relative to that in the United States, where administrative costs are almost four times higher;\textsuperscript{27} the fact that rationing occurs in all health care systems – in the United States based on price, resulting in 39 per cent of the U.S. population having no health insurance coverage at all;\textsuperscript{28} the problem of ‘cream skimming’ within the private system, where providers ‘siphon off high revenue patients and vigorously try to avoid providing care to patient populations who are at financial risk’;\textsuperscript{29} and the overall contribution of the public health care system to social cohesion in Canada.\textsuperscript{30}

Lastly, Justice Piché summarized the evidence of Dr Edwin Coffey, a specialist in obstetrics and gynaecology and the Director of the Montreal District Executive of the Quebec Medical Association, called by the appellants. Coffey argued, based on his own experience and a comparative review of the situation in other member-states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that prohibitions on private health insurance create a ‘unique and outstanding disadvantage that handicaps the health system in Québec and Canada’ and ‘have contributed to the dysfunctional state of our present health system.’\textsuperscript{31} Having earlier noted the failure by the appellants’ other experts to endorse the view that allowing parallel private care would necessarily address waiting times and other access issues,\textsuperscript{32} Justice Piché concluded that Coffey’s opinion on the advantages of allowing private funding was inconsistent with the weight of expert evidence in the case: ‘le Dr Coffey fait cavalier seul avec son expertise et les conclusions auxquelles il arrive.’\textsuperscript{33}

The Charter Analysis in Chaoulli

Justice Piché began her legal analysis of the appellants’ section 7 Charter claim\textsuperscript{34} by reviewing existing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence
on the scope of the right to life, liberty, and security of the person under section 7, including in Singh v Canada,\textsuperscript{35} R. v Morgentaler,\textsuperscript{36} Irwin Toy v Québec (Attorney General),\textsuperscript{37} and Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General).\textsuperscript{38} Based on her review of the case law, Justice Piché concluded that the Supreme Court had left the door open to recognizing economic rights intimately connected to life, liberty, or personal security.\textsuperscript{39} In answer to the question whether access to health care services was such a right, she concluded in the affirmative. In her view, 'S'il n'y a pas d'accès possible au système de santé, c'est illusoire de croire que les droits à la vie et à la sécurité sont respectés.'\textsuperscript{40}

On the specific question of whether the right to contract for private health and hospital insurance, restricted under the legislative provisions at issue, was also protected under section 7, Justice Piché also found the answer to be yes. To the extent that the legislative restrictions on private insurance created economic barriers rendering access to private health care illusory, Justice Piché held that the appellants' rights to life, liberty, and security were affected. As she explained, 'ces dispositions sont une entrave à l'accès à des services de santé et sont donc susceptibles de porter atteinte à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de la personne.'\textsuperscript{41} In Justice Piché's view however, limits on access to private health services would violate section 7 only where the public system was unable to effectively guarantee access to similar care. As Justice Piché put it, '[L]e tribunal ne croit pas par contre qu’il puisse exister un droit constitutionnel de choisir la provenance de soins médicalement requis.'\textsuperscript{42} Justice Piché acknowledged that the appellants were not in actual need of health care, nor of services that they had been unable to obtain within the publicly funded system. Rather, she accepted their claim that resource constraints within the public system, reflected in waiting lists and other access-related problems, combined with the impugned prohibitions on private insurance, meant that the appellants' future health care needs might not be met. Justice Piché agreed that this constituted a sufficient threat to the appellants' life, liberty, and security of the person: 'nous devons conclure, vu l'imprévisibilité de l'état de santé d’une personne, qu’il y a une menace d’atteinte imminente en l'espèce.'\textsuperscript{43}

In light of her finding that the appellants' section 7 rights had been threatened, Justice Piché went on to consider whether the prohibition on private health insurance was 'in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.' In doing so, she first reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Rodriguez\textsuperscript{44} and other cases establishing that, in order to
determine whether a violation of the right to life, liberty, or security of the person is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, the interests of the individual must be balanced against those of the state and society as a whole. Applying this balancing test, Justice Piché pointed out that Quebec’s health insurance legislation was designed to create and maintain a public health care system, universally accessible to all residents of the province, without barriers related to individual economic circumstances. Restrictions on the development of a parallel private system, she found, were put in place by the province to prevent a transfer of resources out of the public system, to the detriment of all members of society. She explained:

La preuve a montré que le droit d’avoir recours à un système parallèle privé de soins, invoqué par les requérants, aurait des répercussions sur les droits de l’ensemble de la population … L’établissement d’un système de santé parallèle privé aurait pour effet de menacer l’intégrité, le bon fonctionnement ainsi que la viabilité du système public. Les articles [contestés] empêchent cette éventualité et garantissent l’existence d’un système de santé public de qualité au Québec.

This balancing of interests in favour of the collective benefit to all residents of Quebec of preserving a viable and effective public health care system, Justice Piché found, was motivated by equality and dignity concerns, and was consistent with Canadian and Quebec constitutional and human rights norms. Such a legislative choice was therefore clearly in conformity with the principles of fundamental justice. Thus, Justice Piché concluded, restrictions on access to private insurance and private health care under provincial health and hospital insurance legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter. While a section 1 justification was therefore not required, Justice Piché expressed the view that such an analysis would demonstrate that the provisions at issue constituted a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society.

The Court of Appeal decision in Chaoulli

Justice Piché’s decision was upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal in three concurring judgments. Justice Delisle found that access to a publicly funded health care system was a fundamental right protected under section 7. In contrast to Justice Piché, he held that the right to contract for private health insurance being claimed by the appellants
was a purely economic interest that was not essential to human life and that it was therefore excluded from section 7 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{53} Justice Delisle warned:

Il ne faut pas inverser les principes en jeu pour, ainsi, rendre essentiel un droit économique accessoire auquel, par ailleurs, les gens financièrement défavorisés n’auraient pas accès. Le droit fondamental en cause est celui de fournir à tous un régime public de protection de santé, que les défenses édictées par les articles précités ont pour but de sauvegarder.\textsuperscript{54}

Justice Forget agreed with Justice Piché that, while the appellants’ section 7 health rights were affected by the statutory limits on private health insurance, the province’s decision to favour the collective interest in maintaining the public health care system was in accordance with section 7 principles of fundamental justice.\textsuperscript{55} For his part, Justice Brossard agreed with Justice Delisle that the contractual rights restricted under the health and hospital insurance provisions at issue were economic rights that were not fundamental to human life. To the extent that the evidence failed to show that the statutory restrictions on private insurance had, in fact, imperilled the appellants’ rights to life or health, Justice Brossard concluded that no violation of section 7 had been shown.\textsuperscript{56}

The Broader Social Implications of Section 7 Review of the Health Care System

As noted at the outset of this chapter, publicly funded Medicare occupies a pre-eminent place in Canadian society. It therefore stands to reason that fundamental health-related interests should be constitutionally recognized and that health care decision-making should respect basic constitutional norms. As Justice Piché affirmed, the right to life, liberty, and security of the person has little meaning for someone who lacks access to medically necessary care in the event of sickness. To the extent that section 7 gives clear constitutional expression to the idea that ‘all are entitled — as a matter of citizenship — to equal access to quality care,’\textsuperscript{57} and that compliance with section 7 norms is likely to generate more open, accountable, and inclusive health care decision-making,\textsuperscript{58} a section 7 review can be characterized as a possible ‘cure’ for some of the problems facing the current health care system.

From a broader, determinants of health perspective, however, the
risks of a section 7 ‘misdiagnosis’ of the health care system are also apparent. In recent years, health care has become the dominant social policy concern in Canada, for governments and the public alike. While the 1995 federal budget repealed the national standards for social welfare programs and services that existed until that point under the Canada Assistance Plan, national conditions under the Canada Health Act have been maintained and continue to be vigorously defended, if not necessarily enforced, by successive federal governments. The result is that in many parts of Canada, for those forced to rely on social assistance, almost the only certainty of food, clothing, and shelter is to fall so ill as to require hospitalization.

Notwithstanding overwhelming evidence that poverty and related social and economic factors such as education and unemployment are the most significant determinants of health, Canadians remain wedded to the idea that access to biomedical services is the best guarantee of individual and public health. At the same time, powerful stakeholder interests, drawing significant media attention, reinforce the view that the publicly funded system is broken and that more acute care spending, both by government and through increased privatization of health funding and services, is required to fix it. As the Mazankowski Advisory Council on Health framed the issue, ‘[i]f we continue to depend only on provincial and federal revenues to support health care services, we have few options other than rationing health care services. On the other hand, if we are able to diversify the revenue sources used to support health care, we have the opportunity of improving access, expanding health care services, and realizing the potential of new techniques and treatments to improve health.’

In the current neo-liberal policy climate, both the demand for more public funding for acute health care services and the call for increased health care privatization have serious negative implications for low-income Canadians. Public and stakeholder demands for more public spending on acute health care, coupled with governments’ own deficit- and tax-cutting agendas, have provided a major impetus for significant reductions in social welfare spending. Over the past decade, as health care spending has gone up, social assistance programs and benefits have been cut across the country by governments of all political stripes. Ironically, these social welfare cuts have occurred without consideration of their impact on the health of the individuals affected or the broader economic and social costs in terms of public health and health care spending.
Demands for increased private health care funding have equally significant negative implications for the poor, inasmuch as they represent a profound threat to the access of low-income Canadians to the health care services that are currently provided within the framework of the Canada Health Act. As the evidence accepted by Justice Piché in the Chaoulli case demonstrates, allowing the development of a parallel private insurance system will have serious adverse consequences for the health care rights of low-income Canadians, both by advantaging those who are able to purchase private health insurance and care and by drawing resources away from and eroding public support for the publicly funded system upon which people living in poverty disproportionately rely.68

As the Chaoulli case illustrates, not only the argument for more public spending, but also the demand for increased private funding and privatization of services, can find support under section 7 of the Charter. In their intervention before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Chaoulli case, for example, the Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Orthopaedic Association,69 along with a group composed of a number of private surgery and diagnostic clinics in British Columbia,70 are supporting the appellants’ claim, based on the argument that if governments are unwilling to devote the necessary resources to eliminate waiting periods for acute care, the system must be opened up to private funding as a matter of section 7 right. The B.C. Clinics argue:

To the extent that individuals are given a reasonable opportunity to secure, in a timely manner, such medically necessary treatment as is not provided by the state, the failure of the state to provide such treatment does not result in a deprivation of s. 7 rights. Personal autonomy in that case would be protected ...

Likewise, the current public health care provisions aimed at preventing the development of a parallel private health care system, including the bar on private health insurance, would arguably not violate the liberty and security of individuals provided that unlimited, or at least adequate, health care resources were available from the state.71

For their part, Committee Chair Michael Kirby and other members of the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, are advancing similar arguments in their intervention in Chaoulli. While professing support for the publicly funded system, the Kirby Committee argues that ‘Health Care Guarantees’ would be sufficient to
preserve its main features and that Quebec’s private health insurance prohibitions should be struck down. The inference is that governments can bring themselves into compliance with section 7, either by increasing public funding to reduce waiting times to a level the Committee deems acceptable, or by allowing the introduction of private funding to achieve the same results. As the Committee repeatedly asserts, 'governments can no longer have it both ways – they cannot fail to provide access to medically necessary care in the publicly funded health care system and, at the same time, prevent Canadians from acquiring those services through private means.'

Quite apart from the fact that the Kirby Committee’s benign assessment of the effects of striking down the impugned provisions is contradicted by the evidence, neither the choice of more public spending on acute care services, nor the prospect of increased private funding, reflect the interests of low-income Canadians. Canadians living in poverty continue to suffer the consequences of governments’ overemphasis on acute health care and their corresponding underinvestment in social welfare programs, social services, and other positive measures to address social determinants of health. People living in poverty also have the most to lose from a move to private funding and a two-tiered health care system.

The Choices Facing the Supreme Court in Chaoulli

To her credit, Justice Piché did not limit her analysis in Chaoulli to the narrow issue of individual autonomy and choice that the rhetoric of health care privatization relies on, and that a narrow reading of section 7 of the Charter permits. Rather, she considered the broader social policy issues raised in the case. In examining the scope of section 7 and the meaning of fundamental justice within the health care context, Justice Piché considered the life, liberty, and security of the person interests of those Canadians for whom access to health care is contingent on rationing that is unrelated to ability to pay. To put it more starkly, Justice Piché’s judgment recognizes that, from the perspective of people living in poverty, a system that imposes some waiting period for all is infinitely preferable to a system in which poor people may wait forever for care.

In deciding the Chaoulli case, the Supreme Court of Canada can either uphold or reverse Justice Piché’s decision and the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal. Whether or not the Court adopts Justice’s
Piché’s interpretation of section 7, in light of its decision in Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), the Court should be expected to defer to her conclusions of fact as to the impact of striking down the current restrictions on private health and hospital insurance funding. As Dr Marmor pointed out in his testimony at trial, opponents of the single-tier system portray the introduction of parallel private insurance funding as being a reform option with no downside: ‘The case for changing the present Canadian prohibition against parallel private health insurance for core medical services rests upon an appealing, but unrealistic theory. It is the view that parallel insurance can be introduced and operated so that no one in Canada would be worse off ... This “win-win” theory has a surface plausibility ... however, a closer examination reveals its theoretical and empirical flaws.”

Justice Piché accepted the evidence presented at trial that striking down the prohibition on private health and hospital insurance would have serious negative consequences for the public system. Nevertheless, the appellants and supporting interveners have continued to argue before the Supreme Court that the harm of striking down the impugned provisions has not been proven. For example, the B.C. Clinics contend that ‘the evidence simply does not support the proposition that the public health care system in Canada will suffer significantly if private payment for insured services is permitted.” The Kirby Committee makes a similar assertion that ‘[a] declaration that the impugned legislation is unconstitutional will not sound the death knell for the Canadian system of publicly funded health care for medically necessary services.” The Supreme Court’s decision whether to accept the appellants’ arguments on this point over Justice Piche’s findings of fact will undoubtedly have a major impact on the outcome of the case.

Beyond the weight of expert evidence, the Supreme Court has been clear that private contractual rights of the type being claimed by the appellants in Chaoulli are not included under section 7 of the Charter. In essence, the appellants and supporting interveners are arguing, not only that they have a right to purchase private insurance, but that governments cannot legislate in such a way that it becomes economically unattractive for the market to provide it. The idea that section 7 includes private corporate-commercial rights of this nature was firmly rejected by the Court in Irwin Toy. The argument that physicians, and by analogy other private health care providers, have a section 7 right to provide health care services has also been dismissed.

However, as the appellants and supporting interveners in Chaoulli
argue effectively, the idea that an individual should be able to choose private care, and that such a choice is fundamental to personal autonomy and dignity, finds significant support in Supreme Court case law. The Court has recently reiterated that the right to liberty under section 7 ‘grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental importance, without interference from the state.’ The appellants and supporting interveners invoke this jurisprudence in support of a purely negative conception of section 7 as a guarantee against measures that ‘prevent individuals from utilizing their own resources’ to obtain private care. As the B.C. Clinics assert, ‘there is no right to have one’s health care … paid for by the government. However … the individual has a right to be protected from government interference with his or her ability to take care of his or her own health.’ Or, as the members of the Kirby Committee state their position, ‘[t]he interveners are not asserting a free-standing constitutional right to health care. Rather, these interveners assert a constitutional right not to be prevented from obtaining ‘timely access to medically necessary care’ in Canada that is not currently available through the publicly-funded system.’

In this regard the appellants and supporting interveners are proposing an underinclusive and discriminatory interpretation of the section 7 right to health: one that recognizes and protects the health care rights of the economically advantaged while denying those of the poor, whose access to health care depends on the existence of the public system. This approach to the right to health care is incompatible both with domestic equality rights principles, and with health and equality guarantees under international treaties ratified by Canada, which the Court has identified as an important guide for Section 7 principles of fundamental justice, and for Charter interpretation generally. In particular, an interpretation of section 7 that entrenches the right to buy private care free from state interference, but not the right to health care per se, is inconsistent with Canada’s international treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to guarantee ‘medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’ without discrimination based on ‘social origin, property, birth or other status.’

The appellants’ and supporting interveners’ definition of the right to health is considerably narrower than the one adopted by Justice Piché, who held that section 7 protects the right to access health care services and the health care system generally. On appeal, Justice Delisle also
found that that the right guaranteed under section 7 is to publicly funded care and rejected the appellants' argument precisely because it amounted to a claim to a right that would be inaccessible to low-income people. The Supreme Court’s choice of either the narrow and decontextualized reading of section 7 put forward by the appellants, or an interpretation of the right to health informed by equality and international human rights principles, will be a determining factor, not only for the outcome of the Chaoulli case, but for the future application of section 7 in the health care context.

In addition to defining the right to health care more narrowly, the interveners supporting the appellants point out that the balancing approach to fundamental justice adopted by Justice Piché at trial was thrown into doubt by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in R. v. Malmö-Levine; R. v. Caine, where the Court cautioned: ‘The balancing of individual and societal interests within section 7 is only relevant when elucidating a particular principle of fundamental justice ... Once the principle of fundamental justice has been elucidated; however, it is not within the ambit of s. 7 to bring into account such “societal interests” as health care costs. Those considerations will be looked at, if at all, under s. 1.’

While section 7 may no longer allow for the balancing approach to fundamental justice applied by Justice Piché at trial, the evidence does make it clear that, aside from promoting broader collective interests in a viable publicly funded health care system, Quebec’s decision to prohibit private health and hospital insurance is neither arbitrary, irrational, nor inconsistent with fundamental social values – the principal requirements of fundamental justice identified by the Court in Malmö-Levine. As Justice Piché found, the prohibitions accord with fundamental justice by ensuring that both individual treatment and broader health policy and resource allocation decisions are based on need, rather than dictated by market pressures shown to generate not only inequitable, but inefficient and irrational health care choices. By ensuring that access to health care is not conditional upon ability to pay, the impugned provisions also reflect and promote the fundamental Charter value of respect for human life, recognized as a matter of societal consensus by the Court in Rodriguez, as well as the widely shared Canadian value that access to health care should be determined by need, not wealth.

As Justice Piché’s judgment recognizes, and as Justice Delisle reiter-
ates on appeal, a failure by governments to ensure access to health care services without barriers based on ability to pay would have a discriminatory impact on the life, liberty, and security of the person of people living in poverty and on others for whom access to publicly funded health care is crucial. In his decision in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) outlining the positive obligations imposed by the Charter in the context of health care services for the deaf, Justice LaForest argued: 'If we accept the concept of adverse effect discrimination, it seems inevitable, at least at the s. 15(1) stage of analysis, that the government will be required to take special measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups are able to benefit equally from government services.' On that basis, it is not the impugned prohibitions on private health and hospital insurance, as the appellants allege, but rather the absence of legislative measures to ensure equal access to health care that should give rise to constitutional question under the Charter.

Conclusion

A recent CBC national broadcast declared that, while health care dominates political debate in Canada, 'the most important decision about the future of health care is actually taking place inside the halls of the Supreme Court of Canada' in Chaoulli. As suggested at the outset of this chapter, lower courts in Canada have generally been unwilling to consider the scope of the publicly funded system as justiciable under section 7 of the Charter. As the B.C. Court of Appeal summarily concluded in a recent case, 'when the Charter was first presented considerable debate ensued as to whether it could apply to provide a positive entitlement to health care. In my view ... it does not.' In this regard, Justice Piché's decision represents a clear change in direction and, as the CBC media clip highlights, the Chaoulli hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada signifies a major turning point both for the Charter and for the Canadian health care system.

As the comparative South African experience (described by Lisa Forman in this volume) illustrates, 'rights and law [have the capacity] to function as powerful gate openers to health care access unreasonably denied by government.' From a health policy perspective, a section 7-based review of health care decision-making represents a potential cure for some of the problems within the current Canadian health care system. Compliance with section 7 principles of fundamental justice
may generate more open, accountable, and participatory decision-making, including in relation to decisions about what services are publicly funded. However, as Greschner and as Flood, Stabile, and Tuohy argue elsewhere in this volume, Charter review of health care decision-making also presents risks. In particular, as suggested earlier, a section 7 review of the health care system runs the very real danger of focusing not on the systemic inadequacies and inequities within the public health care system, but rather on a narrow conception of individual autonomy and choice that fails to acknowledge the positive and collective dimensions of health care entitlements. As outlined above, this danger is clearly illustrated in the Chaoulli case. To the extent that Charter review contributes to or exacerbates the current disconnect between acute health care and broader social welfare and determinants of health as a focus of government concern and spending, a section 7 review risks producing a serious misdiagnosis of the system. In particular, acceptance of the appellants’ and supporting interveners’ claim in Chaoulli that restrictions on private insurance funding are unconstitutional and must be struck down would represent a serious perversion of the right to health – one from which the patient, be it the publicly funded health care system or section 7 of the Charter, would not easily recover.

In the early Charter case of R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,103 former Chief Justice Brian Dickson warned: ‘In interpreting and applying the Charter ... the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the conditions of less advantaged persons.’ More recently, in a discussion paper for the Romanow Commission examining the distributional implications of various health funding options currently under consideration in Canada, health economist Robert Evans explained support for increased privatization of health care services and funding as follows: ‘The real motive underlying proposals for more private financing is very simple. The more private funding we have, the more those with high incomes can assure themselves of first class care without having to pay taxes to help support a similar standard of care for everyone else.’104 Consistent with its recent judgment in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General),105 it is to be hoped that in deciding the Chaoulli case the Supreme Court will prove as sensitive as Justice Piché was at trial to the life, liberty, and security-related health interests of all Canadians, and not simply of the most advantaged.
NOTES

5. Chaoulli c. Québec (Procureure générale), [2000] J.Q. no. 479 (Cour supérieure du Québec – Chambre civil) [Chaoulli (C.S.)].
8. Section 7 provides: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.’

10 Romanow Commission, at xvi.


13 Clair Commission, supra note 9; Mazankowski Report.

14 R.S.Q., c. A-29 [Health IA].

15 R.S.Q., c. A-28 [Hospital IA].


17 Chaoulli (C.S.), supra note 5 at paras. 19–23.

18 Ibid. at paras. 24–39.

19 Ibid. at paras. 44–51.


21 Translation: 'even if it isn't always a question of life or death, all citizens have the right to receive the care they need, and within the shortest possible delay.' Chaoulli (C.S.), supra note 5 at para. 50.

22 Ibid. at paras. 71–115.

23 Ibid. at paras. 109–12.

24 Ibid. at para. 109.

25 Ibid. at paras. 102–15.

26 Ibid. at para. 115.

27 Ibid. at para. 75, per Dr Fernand Turcotte.

28 Ibid. at para. 89, per Dr Howard Bergman; at para. 95, per Dr Jean-Louis Denis.
29 *Ibid.* at para. 91, per Dr Charles Wright.
33 Translation: ‘Dr Coffey is a lone horseman in his expertise and the conclusions to which he arrives.’ *Ibid.* at para. 120.
34 The appellants also argued, unsuccessfully, that the prohibitions on private insurance were matters of federal criminal law and thereby exceeded provincial jurisdiction over health under ss. 92(7), (13), (15) and (16) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*; that the provisions violated the guarantee against ‘cruel and unusual treatment or punishment’ under s. 12 of the *Charter*; and that they discriminated between Quebec residents and non-residents, contrary to s. 15(1) of the *Charter*.
35 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [*Singh*].
36 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [*Margentaker*].
37 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [*Irwin Toy*].
38 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [*Rodriguez*].
39 *Chaoulli* (C.S.), *supra* note 5 at para. 221.
40 Translation: ‘If there is no access to the health care system, it is illusory to think that rights to life and security are respected.’ *Ibid.* at para. 223.
41 Translation: ‘these provisions are an obstacle to access to health services and may therefore infringe life, liberty and security of the person.’ *Ibid.* at para. 225.
42 Translation: ‘The Court does not think, however, that there is a constitutional right to choose where medically required health care will come from.’ *Ibid.* at para. 227.
43 Translation: ‘we must conclude, given the unpredictability of a person’s state of health, that there is an imminent threat of deprivation in the present case.’ *Ibid* at para. 242.
44 *Supra* note 38. As Justice Sopinka expressed it, at 594, ‘where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance the state’s interest ... a breach of fundamental justice will be made out.’
45 *Chaoulli* (C.S.), *supra* note 5 at para. 256.
48 Translation: ‘The evidence shows that the right, claimed by the plaintiffs, to have recourse to a parallel private health care system would have repercussions for the rights of the entire population ... The creation of a parallel, private health care system would threaten the integrity, the effective operation and the viability of the public system. The [challenged]
provisions prevent such an occurrence and guarantee the existence of a quality, public health care system in Québec.' *Ibid.* at para. 263.


51 *Ibid.* at para. 268. Section 1 of the Charter provides: 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.'

52 *Chaoulli* (C.A.), *supra* note 7.


54 Translation: 'The principles at issue must not be inverted so as to make an ancillary economic right essential, and further, one to which economically disadvantaged people would not have access. The fundamental right at issue is that of providing a public health protection system to all, a right which the prohibitions set out under the abovementioned provisions are designed to safeguard.' *Ibid.* at para. 25.


Mazankowski Report, supra note 12 at 52.


Evans, supra note 65 at 37; National Anti-Poverty Organization, ibid.
69 Factum of the Interveners Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Orthopaedic Association in Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General) [Factum of the Interveners CMA and COA].

70 Factum of the Interveners Cambie Surgeries Corporation, False Creek Surgical Centre Inc. and Others in Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General) [Factum of the Interveners Cambie Surgeries Corporation et al.].

71 Ibid. at paras. 26–7; Factum of the Interveners CMA and COA, supra note 69 at para. 19.


73 Ibid. at paras. 7 and 16; Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians: The Federal Role, Final Report, Vol. 6, Recommendations for Reform (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2002) (Chair: Michael Kirby) at 120.


75 Chaoulli (C.S.) supra note 5 at para. 262.


77 Chaoulli (C.S.) supra note 5 at para. 104.

78 Ibid. at paras. 91–3; 103–5.

79 Factum of the Interveners Cambie Surgeries Corporation et al., supra note 70 at para. 56.

80 Factum of the Interveners Senator Michael Kirby et al., supra note 72 at para. 62.

81 Irwin Toy, supra note 37 at 1004.

82 Ibid.


85 Factum of the Interveners Cambie Surgeries Corporation et al., supra note 70 at para. 9; Factum of the Interveners CMA and COA, supra note 69 at para. 22.
86 Factum of the Interveners Cambie Surgeries Corporation et al., ibid. at para. 26.
87 Factum of the Interveners Senator Michael Kirby et al., supra note 72 at para. 32.
88 Greschner, supra note 4 at 21; Factum of the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the Canadian Health Coalition in Choulli v. Quebec.
92 Choulli (C.S.), supra note 5 at para. 223.
93 Choulli (C.A.), supra note 7 at para. 25.
94 Malmo-Levine, supra note 84 at para. 98.
95 Ibid. at paras. 113, 135.
96 Choulli (C.S.), supra note 5 at paras. 66, 76; Evans, supra note 65.
97 Rodríguez, supra note 37 at 608.
101 Jackman, supra note 3.
102 Auton (Guardian ad Litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of Health), [2002] B.C.J. 2258 at para. 73.
104 Evans, supra note 65 at 42.